THE 1960s
CCT
Combat Control Teams validated their mission and even their existence in the 1960s. At the same time a parallel development of special operations and conventional operations shaped CCT career fields and influenced team training. The two mission tracks cross paths and were blurred, but were roughly defined as:
TACHIKAWA AIR BASE, JAPAN - 1961 - "Gidget, the 15 month old mongrel-mascot of 7th Aerial Port Squadron's Combat Control Team, doesn't lead a dog's life.
"She lives the life of a paratrooper.
"Gidget, complete with serial number and a forthcoming rank, makes parachute jumps right along side Combat Controllers.
"Wearing a miniature T-10 parachute with a 12 foot in diameter canopy made especially for her, the female pooch has a record of 12 jumps from a C-130 Hercules aircraft.

Gidget shown at left rigged for jump. In February 1961, Gidget lost here chance
for promotion because of
DNIF--Duty Not Involving Flying. But for a good
reason….. Gidget became the mother of seven puppies.
(USAF Photos by Captain Noel Moore)
"The 25 pound Gidget stands 18 inches high, two feet long, with doe-brown eyes and a rusty-brown colored coat. She made her first jump in May, 1960.
"Gidget was carried in a bag to the aircraft and once over the jump area, her escort, A1C Kennety C. Young, hooked up his static line to the plane and Gidget's line to his person.
"When Young bailed out and his chute opened, he threw the dog into space.
"Her static line opened the chute and she floated safely down to earth. Her rate of descend was the same as the airman.
"When she lands, Gidget always goes to her jumping partner to have the parachute removed. Whenever the canine hits the silk, there is always someone on the ground to make sure she isn't dragged away by the parachute.
"Gidget's serial number is AK 1245602. These numbers were picked for a special reason. The "1" marks Gidget as the 1st Combat Control mascot. Two is for the Second Airborne Dog mascot in Japan. Four is the day, five the month and 60 the year that she arrived in the hands of Combat Control members. The remaining "2" represents Gidget's age upon her adoption, two months old.
"Combat Control airmen bought her as a puppy for 2,000 yen (about $5.50 at that time) at a Tachikawa City pet shop.
"Although not officially a part of the Air Force, orders are now being cut promoting Gidget to A3C, by Captain Noel Moore, OIC of the Combat Control Team.
"A regular personnel record file is kept on her, complete with promotion orders, aeronautical rating, shot records and a physical profile. She is assigned to the barracks of the 7th Aerial Port Squadron.
"Life is full of its ups and downs, even when Gidget isn't flying.
"On July 7, 1960, the Air Force Parachutist badge was presented to her by Captain Moore, along with a pair of shiny new wings. When she completes 25 jumps, Gidget will wear the senior wings.
"However, last February, the mixed-breed lady lost here chance for promotion because of DNIF--Duty Not Involving Flying. But for a good reason….. Gidget became the mother of seven puppies.
"The new offspring given away, she is back to the jump areas at Patton Field, Camp Drew, north of Mito City, about 112 miles northeast of Tachikawa.
"'The moment the tail gate of the C-130 opens, she is ready and eager to go,' said her favorite escort, Young. "She doesn't mind flying," he said, then added, "But, Gidget gets car sick!"
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Gidget is shown in a 1963 Christmas Card photograph of the 7th Aerial Port Squadron, CCT.
Shown (L to R) are: Joe D. Willard, Bill Horton, Bob Farmer, Gene Adcock, Stanley P. Williams,
Lonnie Lynch and Jimmy T. Mobley. Note the newly acquired berets.
(Photo from Gene Adcock collection)
EDITOR'S NOTE: Gidget - the Airborne Pooch - was one of my team mates during the period 1963 to 1966. In fact, I provided quarters and rations for more than a year. The only time she jumped - during my tour - was for an Armed Forced Day - Open House in 1964.
THE STORY OF THE ARMED FORCES DAY JUMP: The Open House demonstration jump was a 6-man CCT and Gidget. It was a C-130 ramp jump and the ramp was opened at the six-minute warning. As we were preparing to rig Gidget, she broke from her leash and ran toward the open ramp. Seeing the error of her ways, she quickly turned and ran back to us - her tail tucked tightly between her legs. We continued the demonstration jump without further incident.
For the Armed Forces Day demo she jumped her specially designed parachute. At exit, she was cradled in the arms of TSgt Stanley P. Williams - resting on his reserve. After Stan opened - he dropped Gidget - her static line was attached to a D-Ring on his harness. All went well, and she completed the jump without further incident.
Open House spectators were duly impressed with GIDGET - THE AIRBORNE POOCH.....................
(ARTICLE WITH GIDGET PHOTOS COURTESY OF SGT MAC'S BAR)
EARLY OPERATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS
by
Bookmark
for future expansion ADCOCK
1. In July 1960, CCT
personnel responded to the
2. Combat Controllers were instrumental in the development of parachuting tactics, techniques, procedures (TTP) and equipment. As an example, TSgt James A. Howell performed the first live supersonic ejection seat test on 24 June 1961. Two years later, he was the primary jumpmaster establishing the upper limits of special operations free-fall parachuting. He led a team of Air Force and Army special operators, exiting the aircraft at 43,000 feet.
3. In November 1962,
combat controllers were some of the first Americans sent to support
NE
ADCOCK
COMBAT
CONTROLLER MAKES FIRST SUPERSONIC EJECTION
by
Bookmark
for future expansion
GENE ADCOCK
24 JUNE 1961 -
Earlier sled test ejections with dummies were run at speeds simulating Mach 2.5 at 9,700 meters (31,500′) altitude, with statistically satisfactory results. Additionally, 35 human test subject sled runs were concluded, verifying that ejections up to 560 mph airspeed were within the range of human endurance.
The “tilt-seat”, as some life support people came to know it, was not entirely satisfactory, however, and after several fatalities were sustained during actual in-flight emergency ejections in the supersonic rated tilt-seat, it was replaced in the F106 aircraft by a more conventional, rocket-powered seat made by the Weber Corporation (this seat was known simply as the “Weber Seat”), from 1964 through 1967.
DCOCK
JUNGLE JIM
Developed from online resources
by
Gene Adcock, CMSgt, USAF, (CCT) Retired
GENE ADCOCK
EARLY APRIL 1961 - THE PENTAGON -- In April 1961, Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis
E. Lemay ordered the creation of the Jungle Jim program at
Creation of Jungle Jim
APRIL 14, 1961 - EGLIN AFB, FL -- The U.S. Air Force established the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS), nicknamed "Jungle Jim," on 14 April 1961 at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Jungle Jim had a twofold mission: training and combat (very close to the assistance and integration levels discussed earlier in this article). Pilots in friendly foreign air forces received a fifty-hour flying course, while their ground crews were trained to maintain aircraft in very austere conditions. Jungle Jim also provided "USAF personnel with optimum-type training for supervising the development of unit combat capability in similar-type aircraft of friendly foreign nations…"7 The combat mission was divided into strike, reconnaissance, and airlift operations.
The Jungle Jim units used vintage aircraft, such as the C-47, T-28, and B-26. These aircraft had proved their ability to operate from remote, primitive bases and had useful capabilities in terms of firepower, range, and cargo capacity for counterinsurgency operations.
Jungle Jim was fully operational by 8 September 1961, and everyone assigned to the unit was trained "on the job." The squadron devised the techniques and tactics for building a counterinsurgency capability in developing countries from Latin America to Africa to Southeast Asia without a basic Air Force doctrine to guide them. All the people of Jungle Jim knew was that someone on high had decreed that the Air Force would have a counterinsurgency capability, and they were it. The idea of visualizing how a small war might be planned and carried out using air power, by itself or in conjunction with other capabilities, had never been studied in the Air Force. Jungle Jim put the Air Force into the counterinsurgency activities for the first time. Only four months after activation, Jungle Jim personnel made their first overseas deployment. Code named Sandy Beach One, this operation involved training Mali paratroopers to operate from C-47 aircraft. The Jungle Jim people noted that just across the airfield at Bamako stood Soviet and Czechoslovak aircraft, a stark reminder that superpower rivalry was beginning to occur in some very obscure places.8 Detachment 1's commandos completed their mission in November and returned to Eglin. Their efforts established such good working relationships that air commandos returned to Mali in 1963 to give more training.
In November 1961, elements from the Jungle Jim squadron deployed to Bien Hoa, Republic of Vietnam. This operation was called Farm Gate; the requirements of supporting it soon became central to Air Force thinking on small wars. The air commandos' equipment was not significantly different from that used by the air commandos in World War II; tactics for using the equipment had to come from the ingenuity and imagination of the men on the scene. To further complicate matters, there was considerable controversy in Washington over just what Farm Gate's mission should be. Some people thought Farm Gate should be involved mostly in operational missions, while others wanted to assign strike sorties to Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and a training role to Farm Gate. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara chose the latter division of roles in December.9 However, Jungle Jim elements continued to conduct combat operations, including night strikes with C-47s dropping flares. Meanwhile, President Kennedy pushed for a universal capability to oppose insurgencies.
The preceding is an exerpt from an article titled "The USAF In Low-Intensity Conflict: The Special Air Warfare Center" by LTC David J. Dean and published by the Air University Review in 1985. Read the entire aricle and see notes at: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/jan-feb/dean.html
THE BUON ENAO PROJECT
by
Art Fields, MSgt, Special Forces Team Leader
Bill Chambers, Captain, Air Commando Pilot
Charlie Jones, SSgt, Air Commando CCT
(Graphics and original layout by Anne Faulkner)
OCTOBER 13, 1961 - THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON DC -- On October 13, 1961 a formerly TOP SECRET document was sent from the White House directing the Air Force to deploy the first detachment of Jungle Jim Air Commandos to Vietnam. The deployment was code named Farmgate and the unit was designated Detachment 2A. From this detachment was the first use of Air Force FAC's using the call sign Dora Corn.


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The "Buon Enao Project" as we knew it, was formally named "The
Tribal Area Development Program", then the "Village Defense Program" and finally
the "Civilian Irregular Defense Group" (CIDG).
There were four "A"
detachments deployed on this mission. My team -- from "B" Company and three from
"C" Company, 1st SFG (LO T-105, dated 28 July 1962) were assigned to relieve
Cpt. Ron Shackleton's team -- which had set up the initial base at Buon Enao --
and to expand the project.
Shackleton only had half a team (7) with him.
Since Cpt. Cordell was the ranking officer, his team was selected to stay at
Buon Enao as the control and support team, acting similar to a "B" team. The
vast majority of the work of training and securing the villages, as well as
patrolling, was done by the outlying and unheralded "A" teams.
We piled our gear and what supplies we were given onto the
vehicles, and with a small lightly armed group of Rhade setout through the
jungle, for the village. There were no roads so the going was slow and rocky as
we hacked our way through the jungle. The Rhade had no vehicles and therefore
did not need roads. Foot and animal paths sufficed.
The village chief had
already started the village fortifications. Upon arriving we built our team
house, commo bunker, ammo storage bunker, infirmary, and other facilities that
were needed. We did this in conjunction with training the men of the village in
the use of weapons and tactics. We also trained and armed a strike force
battalion.
Then we started reaching out and bringing in the surrounding
villages. We trained and armed them and then sent them back to their villages,
along with a strike force unit to defend them while they fortified their village
and made it secure. All the while we kept up our patrols in ever increasing
range, using secured villages as patrol bases in a stepping stone fashion.
As we went along, we had to develop new techniques and tactics. As we
advanced toward the Cambodian border the VC started emptying out the villages
that we had not yet reached -- taking the villagers into the jungle and going
underground. We discovered the VC had established a training camp in the
foothills of the Cu Ken mountains near Ban Don along the Song Srepok River. This
VC base stood between us and Ban Don, so we decided to take it out.
We cleared a Landing Zone at our
primary base in Buon Tah Mo and readied our Strike Force, equipping them with
German 9mm MP-40 submachine guns, new web gear, black uniforms, bush hats and
Batta boots.
The plan was to hit and destroy the VC training camp and
then one company would sweep north in a "U" and the other company would sweep
south in a "U", with both companies returning by foot back to base camp at Buon
Tah Mo. There were no officers on the ground for this operation. The code name
and my call sign for this operation was POWDER BLUE.
BILL: Bob Walker and I were getting bored sitting around and nothing happening. The U-10 was sitting on the ground also waiting for some word from the field that they had contact with the bad guys (you were out in the field with them??) Your Capt. said he was sure he could find some targets for us, and he went with Capt. Booth and Sgt. Foxx in the U-10. They were going to make contact with the forces on the ground and find us some targets. We were to take off about 30 minutes after they did.
The CIA guy was going to fly in the back seat with me, but he had finished off too many bottles of gin the night before and could not even climb up on the wing of my aircraft. We decided he could fly with me later-that was one time that the gin saved his life. (By the way- of the seventy some-odd missions I flew there, I had a Vietnamese in the back seat two times and they were privates, we hardly ever flew with them in the aircraft).
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CHARLIE: We did sporadically contact Art's troops who had moved in by helicopter across a ridge west of us. We talked to the U-10 (Foxx was on the FM) that over flew us in preparation of air strikes by Commando T-28's. We received a single radio transmission that the U-10 was on fire and was going down. We could not raise anyone on the radios, and Helmick and I set out toward the shoot down site.
Then the Commando T-28's began to over fly us. We were horrified at the thought that the guys (Billy Chambers and Walker, I think) would mistake us for the VC and attack us. As it turns out they did not and we felt safer with them overhead. We frequently threw colored smoke to let them know of our willingness to be seen.
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BILL: I well remember seeing your orange smoke on the ground. We had been briefed that you would mark your position with it. Too bad our communications were so bad- maybe I would have avoided being downed. I also remember being briefed that if you needed air support you would lay down panels on the ground with an arrow pointing in the direction of the target with strips ( I forget how many for so many kilometers) indicating distance! Glad you didn't have to do that- I can think of better things to do than be under fire while trying to lay down panels! Hope our services can talk to each other today.
CHARLIE: I also took those marker panels and cut holes in them and made the Rhade wear them like a cape so you could see us. I was very frightened that you guys would shoot us. One or two of the Rhade kept saying, when they saw you guys scrutinizing us, "We must run, Airplane shoot!" I kept yelling no, no! If we run we are dead! I finally told my interpreter, Peter Gunn, to tell them that the first man to run I would shoot him myself. They calmed down after you guys flew down and inspected us, and began to overfly us as we traveled.
BILL: Charlie, I wondered about them wearing orange with the VC around, but it sure made it easy for us to see you. They looked like they were moving very orderly. I remember some of you waving at us. I sure wanted to have radio contact with you.
CHARLIE: My waving included me clasping my hands onto my ears as though placing headsets. I wanted to try, against the facts, to see if you could contact us on the pitiful PRC-10 (FM) set we were using. I remember the one low pass you or Walker made at your own risk to "check us out" and I'm probably alive today due to (1) you doing that and seeing we were Caucasians and not Asians, and then (2) flying over us till dark!
ART: In the early morning of 15 Oct 1962, three C-21C Shawnee (Flying Bananas) helicopters flew in. The first lift was loaded and the copters lifted off.
I was standing in the door of the lead chopper and it was struggling with it's heavy load. All of a sudden the door filled with tree branches and leaves, I thought we were going down for sure, but the pilot gave it the gas and we went up above the treetops. When we landed at the objective we immediately captured two VC. The Viet Cong prisoners were brought over to me and upon questioning them, my interpreter, pointing to the jungle, said to me: "many VC! many VC!!" I threw a smoke grenade toward the VC encampment and the B-26 started its run, dropping bombs and strafing the area. Not all the VC in the camp had small arms and those that were not killed scattered into the thick jungle. They were in small groups that we encountered during the remainder of the operation. We had to be careful of the women and children that were with them
By the evening of 15 October 1962, we had destroyed the VC training camp and were securing the objective. I was in communication with the senior Special Forces Commander, CPT Terry Cordell, coordinating the resupply of ammo and supplies in order to continue the mission. My Radio Operator was up in a tree putting up the jungle antenna for better communication. CPT Cordell was in the HELIO U-10D observation aircraft, flying overhead -- low and slow. I was speaking with him on the FM radio (PRC-10) and suddenly he went blank. My Radioman shouted, "look! look!!" I looked up and saw the aircraft going straight up with fire coming from the nose area. It looped over and started spiraling down into the jungle. On board the plane were CPT Terry D. Cordell (U. S. Army Special Forces, 1st SFG, Okinawa) and two USAF personnel, Capt Herbert W. "Willoughby" Booth Jr., the pilot, and T/Sgt Richard L. "Dick" Foxx, the Combat Air Controller (USAF Det. 2 Alpha, 1st Air Commando Group) All were killed in the resulting crash.
CHARLIE: As night approached, we came upon a grass house village unoccupied. We torched it to give off smoke the next morning, expecting this would aid the hoped for arrival of T-28s the next morning. Due to a raging mad Gaur (this is a type of wild water buffalo) roaring toward us, we had our Rhade shouting to each other. Art's group was at this time arriving from the West toward the shootdown site. We joined with them.
Art's group got to the downed plane before we did. All aboard were dead, and very badly burned, as was the plane. I commend Art. He was the ranking man and he took immediate charge. We had a few families with crying babies who had somewhere joined the group. We had a pitiful defense in numbers. Under Art's command we decided not to try to outshoot the VC. They probed us all night, and sounded trumpets or whistles. Helmick and I took the horizontal stabilizer from the wreck and propped it up so we could lie and lean on it during the long night. I was glad for daylight.
ART: It was night and very dark in deep thick jungle when we reached the crash site. The Viet Cong were also trying to reach the crash site and we killed a few in the process of locating the wreckage. When the plane went down through the jungle trees, the left wing had broken and folded over the cockpit. I found all three aboard dead with their bodies severely burned.
I set up a defensive perimeter (circle) around the crash site to keep the VC from the bodies and the still smoldering wreckage. Because I had no way of knowing for sure if there were VC within the circle I gave the order that anything that moved within or without the defensive position would be shot. Luckily we had sealed off the area before the VC had penetrated it. I radioed in my coordinates and called for a chopper to evacuate the KIAs. I was told that the chopper would be coming from Pleiku and would arrive in the early morning.We left the bodies in the wreckage until the next morning. The VC probed our defenses all night with sporadic small arms fire, bugles and whistles.
At daybreak I sent out a party to search for a clearing to be used as an Landing Zone for the incoming chopper. A clearing was found and it was checked out for obstacles and panels were laid out marking the spot. It was later verified from the air that the clearing we had marked for the LZ was in fact the only clearing for miles. First to arrive (unannounced) was a C-47 and a A H-34 helicopter. The C-47 made a couple of passes over the crash site and flew off toward BMT. The H-34 with USAF Air commandos Col. Mike Doyle (CO), SSG Hap Lutz (medic) and SSG William Cody (Combat air controller) aboard landed at the LZ we had set up. The H-34 was flown by an American, with a Vietnamese "advisee" in the other seat. The H-34 came under fire and lifted off. It went around a couple of times before they could land again.
We had extracted the bodies from the wreckage and loaded them on stretchers. When the H-34 finally touched down again we quickly loaded the bodies, along with the recovery team, and it lifted off for Ban Me Thout where the C-47 was waiting to take them to Saigon.
Just as the H-34 was lifting off a FARM-GATE AT-28 came in low and slow and was also shot down. It came screaming into the ground and almost hit us. People were running for cover. I am sure that it was one of the same planes that provided air cover the previous day. It was fully loaded. Ammo was exploding like the 4th of July in the burning wreckage. Despite exploding ammunition and ordnance shrapnel set of by the intense heat and thick smoke from the devastating fire of the burning aircraft I got him (Capt. Bill Chambers) out of the wreckage alive. I almost lost some of our people looking for the second pilot before we realized there was none. The pilot had taken off without his Vietnamese counterpart. A short time later a CH-21 came wobbling in and we placed the badly injured pilot aboard for evacuation.
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Later that day we tracked down the group of VC that had shot down the two aircraft. They were holed up in a straw shack at the edge of a rice-field. We surrounded the hut and engaged them in a firefight. They were all killed. As we were mopping up, we discovered that the weapon used to bring down the aircraft was an American BAR, probably left over from the Indo-China War.
BILL: Yes, I did fly air support on 15 Oct. but we didn't expend any ordnance. We saw you on the ground but you had not made contact with the VC. It may have looked like there was only one aircraft (you probably never saw us close together - we always flew spread out quite a bit) but we always flew two T-28s together. I'm not sure of the B-26 pilot, but I think it might have been Capt. Van Hovel from our unit. We were the only ones flying B-26s and AT-28s at that time. I think that Air America later flew them. Gene Rossel might know about Van Hovel. I was told that the B-26 later finished off my T-28 (bombed). I learned later that they found only one bullet hole in the aircraft - right in the carb. What a lucky (or unlucky) shot.
CHARLIE: First one of the wobbly H-21s came, then the beautiful T-28s. Then, the Air Commando Commander Lt. Col. Miles Doyle and Commando Medic Hap Lutz arrived in either an H-19 or H-34. It was piloted by an American Army "advisor" and a Vietnamese "advisee," and the American crew chief. It came under fire, and went around once or twice, Doyle wanted to see the crash site, so we had to move him along the trail to the site. We finally got the bodies positioned on stretchers to place aboard the chopper, when I heard the sounds of gunfire I tried to recognize as a fifty cal. Art later said it was a BAR. WE had Billy overhead flying cover for us. The saddest thing in cases like this is the lack of communication. I could not tell Billy what I was hearing, to warn him, and sure enough, he was downed, almost crashing into us as the H-19 lifted off.
BILL: When I took the hit I quickly considered blowing the canopy and dropping the ordnance but there were friendlies in the area and heavy jungle. An open canopy has about the same drag as the speed brake open. So, I had to take my chances. As it was, I took some tops out of trees before getting to the clearing.
ART: A CH-21 helicopter was called in to take out the bodies, however the KIAs had already been evacuated aboard the H-34 when it arrived. Bill Chambers AT-28 had just crashed so we placed him aboard the CH-21 and it took him to Ban Me Thout where the C-47 was waiting to fly them all to Saigon. Later that day we tracked down the group of VC that had shot down the two aircraft. They were holed up in a straw shack at the edge of a rice-field. We surrounded engaged them in a firefight and killed them all. That was when we discovered that the weapon used to bring down the aircraft was an American BAR probably left over from the Indo-China War.
I returned to base camp (Buon Tah Mo) with over four hundred villagers that we had liberated from the VC. We were greeted by the brass from Saigon who took our film and debriefed us. So far as can be determined this was the first helicopter assault of the Vietnam War led by an American.
In November my team split sending half (six) to open a base camp at Ban Don.They were CPT McFadden (promoted while on TDY), MSG (E7) Chitwood SFC (E7) Planck, SSG Grabish, SGT Hamilton, and SP5 Van Koevering.
In the meantime, we continued to secure and train villagers and kill VC until we deployed back to Okinawa in February 1963.
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CHARLIE: We flew the bodies to a masonry type one room structure and posted a Vietnamese guard on the place. We re-boarded the chopper to return to try to get Billy out. Art and an H-21 had extricated him, unknown to us until we landed back there. It was back at the village, Buon Enao, when I was questioned closely by some regular Army Colonels about all this (by Doyle, too, who directed me back to Bien Hoa for more reports). We were worried about the possible consequences of not having a Vietnamese "advisee" aboard either the T-28 or the U-10).
At Bien Hoa, I received a call from some Army Capt. in Saigon. They flew me to Tan Son Nhut where I was picked up in a jeep and taken to a makeshift morgue. There I verbally scuffled with the "mortuary officer," (an extra duty, I'm sure) over HOW I knew the identities of the remains of my buddies! We tagged them, and they were replaced in the cooler. I foolishly had placed Foxx's forty-four magnum Ruger in with his body, thinking it would accompany him home. It was ruined, the heat had fired the rounds in the cylinder, and the pressure had badly warped the piece. I thought Joanne, his wife, or his family would cherish it as a memento. They never got it.
About a week later, we formed in a formation for the bodies to be loaded aboard a C-123 for the flight to the Philippines, to be further "groomed" for shipment home.
I was there (Buon Enao) when Capt. Colt Terry came to replace Capt. Cordell, and served under him till I left Buon Enao for Father Hoa's village in the South in the last of November. SSGT Charles Cody came to replace Foxx. Capt. Ramey and Al Wight replaced the needs for the U-10 pilots for our SF work.
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This is a very abbreviated recollection of the events surrounding the very astute leadership of Art, and his life-saving actions of Billy Chambers and the others, and facts about the first FACs to be KIA in the SEA war.
BILL: We took off and tried to contact the U-10 on the radio and could not raise them. We called the camp to see if they had contact with them but they couldn't contact them either. So Bob and I flew around the area looking for them. Finally we saw this smoke coming up from the ground and it was their aircraft. One wing was folded over the cockpit.
The next morning Bob and I were flying cover for the recovery team, which included Lt. Col. Miles Doyle, our commander from Bien Hoa who had flown in the night before. We had contact with the recovery team on the ground and they reported no contact with hostile forces. I was making passes over our people, really just "showing the Eagle" to try to keep the VC from trying anything. I was in the middle of one pass when my engine lost power and smoke started streaming out of it. I didn't know whether I'd blown a jug or what.
I let Walker know I was going down and apparently the Chopper was on our frequency and took off immediately. I was too low to bail out (no ejection seat) and had to ride it in. About all that was left of the T-28 was the cockpit laying on its side. I couldn't get the canopy open more than about one third. I remember when the aircraft finally stopped, I tried to blow the canopy but it wouldn't move (it used compressed air to blow back the canopy and the air line was apparently ruptured). I then moved the canopy handle to manual and tried to pull it open. It opened a few inches, enough to get part of my shoulder on it. I finally got it opened enough to try to squeeze out, but the shoulder holster hung up on the railing. I had to get back inside and move the holster under my armpit, then was barely able to get out. I would never have been able to get the CIA guy out of the back seat.
I then moved - bent over because my back was injured and I couldn't stand up - to the nearest undergrowth and prepared to fight it out as long as I could. We had been told by our Intel. that the VC would capture you if you could move with them, otherwise they would put a bullet in your head. Almost immediately, I saw the H-21 coming into the landing. A crewman was standing the doorway with a machine gun. I stood up as much as I could and waved my arms and started moving toward the Chopper. The guy in the chopper waved for me to stay put. Unknown to me at the time, Rhade Montagnard Strike Force troops under the command of MSG Fields had secured the clearing, which was the only one around, as a landing zone for the CH-21 flying in from Pleiku to evacuate the bodies of the three KIAs. MSgt. Fields and some of his troops got a stretcher from the chopper, placed me on it, and then loaded me on the H-21 for evacuation. The H-21 took me to the Ban Me Thuot airfield where a C-47 was standing by to fly me out. I have no idea what unit the CH-21 was assigned to. In 1962 the Army was the only one flying this aircraft there. The Marines flew the H-34s. I was told it was the same bird that flew the brass into the U-10 crash site. The C-47, B-26, AT-28s and the U-10 were all FARMGATE aircraft and crews.
I know this has been windy but I wanted to tell you everything I remembered. An interesting note: While I was in the hospital at Clark AFB having X-rays taken, I was visited by another CIA type. He wanted to let me know what to say if anyone asked me questions. I was to say that I did have a Vietnamese in the back seat with me, etc. As you know, I can't verify any of what he told me (maybe you can), but he told me they had captured two Chinese advisors. He further said that they (CIA, or whoever "they" were) had turned the interrogation of the two over to a French team.
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ART: I am in the process of setting the record straight on the death of CPT Terry Cordell, the first U.S. Army Special Forces officer killed in combat in Vietnam, and the two USAF Airmen, Capt. Herbert Booth and TSgt Richard Foxx killed in the same aircraft with him. The information I have provided will go a long way toward this goal. In my research I was appalled to find that not one person involved in this operation has ever been contacted, yet much has been written. "OPERATION POWDER BLUE" has been documented as the first American helicopter assault operation of the Vietnam War. Without question this was the most significant assault operation of the "Buon Enao Project" and the "Village Defense Program". Because of the three Americans KIA during this operation the Army was forced to go public; and sadly it in part greatly influenced the decision to implement "Operation Switchback", which put us under command and control of the MACV and back in uniform.
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OCK - EDITOR
SERGEANT VON RYIK
Combat Controller
Possesses Versatile Military Career
Article
Submitted
by
Jim
Stanford, SMSgt, USAF (CCT) Retired
GENE ADCOCK

Sam the cougar and Sergeant Walter von Ryik, two of the most unusual Air
Commandos to ever work in an intelligence office!
Security was never a
problem with Sam around. Sergeant von Ryik was later assigned to the
319th Combat Control Team. (Photo from online document)
Member of German AF – In April 1942, von Ryik enlisted in
the Luftwaffe (German Air Force), received his basic training at
Early in 1943, Sergeant von Ryik was
sent into combat in
Combat Action – During combat action Sergeant von
Ryik was shot down three times and wounded five times. The first time was
early in 1943 when he was attacked by a group of Ratas, Yaks, and King
Cobras. He was able to bail out and land safely behind the German
lines. The second time occurred in September of 1943 when he was hit by a
Yak 9 and crashed in Russian territory. He was captured by the Russians
and held prisoner among captured German infantry. That night, although
suffering from a wound encounter in aerial combat he and his fellow prisoners
broke out of the farm house where they had been locked, killed the guard and
escaped to their own lines. The third time was in the summer of 1944 when
his aircraft was shot down again by enemy aircraft forcing him to parachute,
having received multiple wounds including the temporary loss of his
eyesight. He was rescued by a squad of German Wehrmacht (infantry) and
helped back to the German lines. Due to his wounds, Sergeant von Ryik was
sent to a hospital in
Captured By Russians – In the spring of 1945 the Russians
were through the front lines and Sergeant von Ryik was sent into battle as an
infantry officer. He was wounded again in the defense of
Sergeant von Ryik then went to
Left Active Duty – The next three years of Sergeant von
Ryik’s life were spent in
In April 1954, Sergeant von Ryik
enlisted in the Air Force and became a
Awards – Sergeant von Ryik’s awards and decorations include: Luftwaffe Pilot Wings, German Air Medal, German Purple Heart in Gold (wounded five times) Iron Cross 1st Class; German Cross in Gold, German Infantry Badge, for three combat operations; and the German Close Combat Badge.
“My career has just begun,” Sergeant von Ryik commented as he went to the field on another air commando combat control training mission.
NOTES: 1. This article was transcribed
from a well-worn copy of an undated article that appeared in “The
COMMANDO” - base newspaper of
2.
Walter F. von Ryik, age 80, died January 27, 2004, after a long battle with
cancer. A memorial service in his honor was held on Sunday, February
1 at the Unitarian Universalist Fellowship of the
GENE ADCOCK
JANUARY 1962 – POPE AFB, NC — The outcome of a war could well depend on how fast effective troops are delivered to the firing line. One small group of airmen would have an important role in the delivery. Most airmen walk to work. These men parachute. To them, a ‘chute is just another mode of transportation to one of the toughest jobs in the Air Force.
You don’t hear much about this
small but very select group of men who make up Combat Control Teams. They
are tougher than the job. A few months ago 45 airmen attending
Just what is this job and what makes it so tough? It is mostly communications and air traffic control work. First, these men must be either control tower operators or ground radio mechanics, which isn’t too hard. Like all traffic controllers, they must be able to think on their feet and make decisions on their own. They must be—and stay—in top physical condition.
The teams locate, identify, and mark the drop zones and landing zones for the Army’s airborne operations. Then they guide TAC’s troop carrier pilots into position so the soldiers can parachute into, or land in, enemy territory as close as possible to their objective. To do this the Combat Control Team (CCT) must be down in the drop zone before the paratroopers are overhead.
The toughest part of the CCT job, the part that demands top physical condition, is getting to their duty station and setting up operations. They may get there by crawling on their bellies through enemy lines guided only by guts, a map, and a compass. Sometimes they may be landed from a submarine, small surface craft, or a rubber boat. More often they parachute ahead of, or with the first airborne troops. Or they may be air-landed from the first assault transport plane. During training, or in a very rare combat situation, they might just drive up in a jeep with the help of friendly natives.
Weightier than their combat gear is a team’s responsibility to be sure the troop carrier pilots drop their troops right on the proper impact point. Jump troops are most vulnerable to enemy action in the few brief minutes it takes them to float down, collect their equipment, and organize into fight-ready combat units.
Using visual and electronic aids, the combat controllers furnish aircrews the information they need to deliver the soldiers and their equipment precisely so that a minimum of effective fighting time is lost. The job demands a full and complete understanding of troop carrier techniques and procedures, along with a cool-headed direction of closely spaced aircraft converging on a single point under combat conditions.
Although the combat controllers carry full combat gear, an Army Assault Team (AAT) accompanies them to set up perimeter defenses and provide protection while the CCT concentrates on its job. The AAT jumps out one side of the aircraft, the CCT out the other. Precise timing is essential. Every man in each team knows what his job is and how to do it in the minimum of time.
The Airman (magazine) visited some of these rare airmen (less than a hundred in the entire Air Force) at Pope AFB, N.C. Pope is located on the Fort Bragg military reservation, home of the Army’s famous 82nd Airborne Division. There combat jump training is almost continuous. Combat controllers from the 464th Troop Carrier Wing’s, 3rd Aerial Port Squadron (3APS) get on the drop zones early every day. They stay quite late sometimes, for night drops are part of the training program too.
There are six active Aerial Port
Squadrons in the Air Force: one each in Europe and the
At this writing the squadron had a total of 26 jump qualified controllers, 2 less than two full teams. But despite the manpower shortage, morale is high which is traditional in Aerial Port Squadrons. “More than once my men have been selected as the sharpest airmen o