THE 1950s

1952-1953 - KOREA -- During the Korea war, operational security limited the use of Pathfinders in the three main airdrops of the war. At the same time turf battles raged in Washington as both Army and Air Force leaders tried to figure out how to handle the Pathfinder mission. The Army wanted to retain its Pathfinder teams, while Air Force leaders believed there were three major disadvantages to Pathfinder operations:

Additionally, the Air Staff contended that air traffic control (ATC) was an Air Force-unique mission. The Department of Defense (DOD) agreed and the mission of the glider borne CCT was combined with that of the Pathfinders and given to the USAF. The Army, on the other hand, made no bones about its willingness to continue fulfilling the Pathfinder role. The Army has never deactivated its Pathfinder units although their primary mission has evolved to emphasize helicopter operations.

Initially, the Air Force gave little more than lip service to their newly acquired program. The long-range plan was to do away with Pathfinders. Senior leadership believed that electronic NAVAIDs would relieve them of the requirement to put Pathfinder units in the field altogether. The crisis came to a head in mid-1952 and something had to be done quickly or the Air Force would lose the mandate to field Pathfinder teams. The Tactical Air Command (TAC) ordered Eighteenth Air Force to take the necessary steps to fix the problem. On 14 October 1952, the first 10 USAF Pathfinders attended jump school.

Anticipating an influx of trained Pathfinders, Eighteenth Air Force activated the Pathfinder Squadron, Provisional, on 15 January 1953 at Donaldson Air Force Base (AFB), South Carolina. The initial plan was to fill the unit with sister-service transfers primarily from the Army. Surprisingly, they hoped to form six Pathfinder teams, but were lucky to get enough men for one team.

On the 27th of March 1953, the Pathfinder Squadron, Provisional, was deactivated and the jumpers were assigned to 1st Aerial Port Squadron (APS) and officially designated a Combat Control Team - or CCT. The Army leadership continued to be very critical of the Air Force usurping what they felt was an Army mission. The USAF was vulnerable to criticism, as it seemed unwilling to fully assume its responsibility, focusing instead on developing supersonic fighters, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and long-range bombers.

SUMMER 1953 - DOBBINS AFB -- A Waterloo of sorts, for the Army Pathfinder's versus Air Force CCTs, occurred in August 1953. The 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) at Dobbins AFB, Georgia, refused to comply with directives that incorporated CCTs into their joint tactical missions. Although, Special Forces (SF) had no objection to controllers working drop zones and participating in practice jumps, they did not want CCT personnel integrating into their missions. As a result, Tactical Air Command (TAC) suspended all US Army support airlift missions on 11 August 1953, until the Army and Special Forces reversed their decision. The unfortunate incident did have a positive result in that it served to reinvigorate the USAF’s commitment to Combat Control Teams.

THE AIR FORCE PATHFINDER PROBLEM
Transcribed from an incomplete copy of an 18^th Air Force Unit History and Edited
by
Gene Adcock, CMSgt, USAF (Retired)

SECRET

1 July - 31 December 1953 – Donaldson AFB, SC – The Pathfinder problem has been ongoing and continuing in nature. It was recognized by the air force (early in the postwar period) that measures developed during World War II could only be termed "a means to an immediate end" as they possessed too many inherent disadvantages—an insufficient element of surprise, the dropping of teams in the lead serial which often aborted identification of the Drop Zone, and, from the air force's viewpoint, the undesirability of the utilization of army personnel.

Notwithstanding these objections, the air force failed to give little more than lip service to its contentions that pathfinder responsibilities should be inherently its function. With the advent of a separate troop carrier force, the pathfinder area of responsibility gained import. Both the army and the air force realized that pathfinder techniques were integral to troop carrier operations and that the doctrines developed by the XVIII Airborne Corps and Eighteenth Air Force would play an important part in both peace and war concepts of vertical envelopment. However, the air force was considerably remiss in its aggressiveness and continued to buffet the pathfinder problem around throughout 1952.

The army, on the other hand, was positive in its attitude and made no bones about its willingness to continue fulfilling pathfinder requirements. Rather it made strong emphasis of the fact that the air force would be usurping army responsibility if it tried to make an inroad in pathfinder procedures.

In early 1952, the air force realized that it would have to take a definite stand on the pathfinder problem as the numerous joint missions, maneuvers, and demonstrations to which the Eighteenth Air Force was committed served notice that a vacillating attitude could not longer be tolerated. In February 1952, TAC took an initial step when it directed this headquarters to designate a minimum of four lead crews in each troop carrier group to specialize in pathfinder training. This was movement toward making pathfinder teams organic to the wings.

Prior to receipt of TAC’s directive, the 62d Troop Carrier Wing (Heavy) had submitted a proposal to the Eighteenth Air Force that was opposed to the formers supposition. The 62d believed that the pathfinder element was of such value that it should be a separate unit under command rather than a function organic to individual wings. ⁴⁶ The 62d’s study was based, on the logic that pathfinder teams in a separate unit could concentrate on electronics, standardize techniques, and, of great import, become more proficient by participating in more numerous missions than could be realized if organic to a single wing.

46. Memo Hq 62d Trp Carr Wg 25 Jan 1952 for Ltr of Operations, sub: Troop Carrier Pathfinder Org and Requirements (SECRET History Eighteenth Air Force, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1952).

EDITOR'S NOTE

This report was UNCLASSIFIED when received. It was previously downgraded from SECRET.

SECRET

Conversely, TAC's decision for not desiring to establish a subordinate unit was the fact.that the training lead crews would ultimately result in a saving of manpower and equipment. The Eighteenth threw its support to the 62d as it was believed that the lead crew system would not satisfy troop carrier requirements because of the inability of existing electronics equipment to assist the lead formation in locating the Drop Zone. Furthermore, a second factor detrimental to the lead crew system is that saturation of the Drop Zone with personnel and equipment hampers initial activities of the lead crew pathfinder team in becoming operational.

As a consequence, Eighteenth Air Force reiterated its stand that the lead crew system should be abandoned in favor of separate pathfinder aircraft and teams until such time as electronic and similar navigational equipment are developed. This theme was further developed at a conference on 21 May 1952 at Headquarters Eighteenth Air Force when representatives of this and higher headquarters recommended that (l) Army Field Force Pathfinder Teams be utilized until 1 January 1953, since the air force had no personnel trained in-this function, and (2) that research be continued for electronic devices capable of guiding aircraft to the Drop Zone without the aid of pathfinder teams.

This search for electronic devices received impetus throughout the remainder of 1952 through the medium of Exercise TEST DROP and allied studies by both the Air Proving Ground Command and Wright Air Development Command. These studies proved one definite fact--existing navigational equipment had marked potentialities but none possessed all the capabilities required to eliminate the need for pathfinder personnel. Accordingly, the air force had to prepare to accept its pathfinder responsibilities on 1 January 1953, three years after Joint TAC-OCAFF directive had made the air force responsible for establishing and maintaining ground-to-air communications and navigational aids to the Drop Zone.

It is believed that a more positive approach to the problem had been held in abeyance by an innate belief that the development of electronic navigational aids would preclude a requirement for personnel drops in advance of the main assault echelon. However, time proved this to be "wishful thinking”; and, the Airborne Troop Board at Fort Bragg alleged that the air force was "failing to carry the ball^” in pathfinder development. It was the consensus of the airborne that its potential was being placed in jeopardy by the air force, since the latter had not provided pathfinder teams in accord with the dictates of the 1 September 1950, Joint TAC-OCAFF Memorandum.⁴⁷

To offset this deterrent, the airborne had retained its organic pathfinder teams as an interim measure. The practicability of this action could not be questioned by the air force as it had no pathfinder elements and army parachute troops were required for implementation of Exercise TEST DROP.

47. Memo Director Joint Airborne Troop Board to Dir Joint Air Transportation Board, sub: Accomplishment of the Pathfinder Mission, 28 July 1952.

SECRET

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

SECRET

Consequently, both TAC and Eighteenth Air Force accepted the army's proposal to provide assistance, pending the training of air force pathfinder agencies to a state of readiness where they could accept full responsibility for this function. In consonance with this proposal, the Eighteenth Air Force, late in August 1952, requested that TaC take necessary action to obtain quotas for air force personnel at the Army Jump School. An immediate allocation of 10 was approved by the army for the 14 October 1952 class, with an additional quota of two per week authorized for the period 21 October 1952 - 27 January 1953.

Activation of the Pathfinder Squadron (Provisional)
In anticipation of an influx of trained pathfinder personnel, the Eighteenth Air Force activated a Pathfinder Squadron (Provisional) in January 1953, as a medium for implementing air force responsibilities in pathfinder activities. ⁴⁸It was anticipated that this organization, attached to Headquarters Squadron Section, Eighteenth Air Force for administrative and logistical support would be the forerunner of a T/0 unit as the Eighteenth Air Force had forwarded a proposed pathfinder squadron table of organization to higher headquarters late in December 1952. ⁴⁹ Premised on this expectancy, action was initiated in January to procure army personnel to man the new unit. ⁵⁰ Included in those requirements was a request for one officer and 13 enlisted men from the airborne’s pathfinder detachments to man the squadron.

Headquarters. USAF did not concur in the proposed utilization of SCARWAF ^Edpersonnel on the premise that air force personnel could be selected and trained from available manpower sources. Neither was favorable consideration given to this headquarters' recommended pathfinder squadron table of organization (T/O), as this was to be the only unit of its type in the air force and USAF did not consider a T/0 appropriate. As an alternate solution, this headquarters recommended that TO 1-1967 be utilized as manning authority for pathfinder elements, and that the composition of this document includes authority for six pathfinder teams. ⁵¹ A conference at Headquarters USAF in early March 1953 concluded that this was a feasible solution to the problem and TO 1-1967, as finalized by the conferees, contained an authorization to for these teams in Part II A. ⁵²

______________________________________________________________________________________________________

48. GO 5, Hq 18AF, 15 Jan. 1953.

49. Ltr., Hq 18th AF to Comdr TAC, 200, sub: proposed Pathfinder Squadron Table of Organization, 23 Dec. 1952.

50. Ltr., Hq 18th AF to Comdr TAC, 200, sub: Procurement of Army Pathfinder Personnel, 1/26/53.

Ed. Editor's Note: Special Category Army Reassigned With Air Force.

5l. Recorded TP call, Lt. Col. Clugston, Hq 18th AF to Maj. Winn, TDY to USAF, 3/4/53.

52. Ltr., Hq 1st Aerial Port Operations Sq to Comdr 18th AF, 319.1 sub: Report of Visit, 3/11/53

53. GO 22, Hq 18AF, 3/26/53.

SECRET

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

SECRET

The 1st and 2d Aerial Port Operations Squadrons (Ed: APOS) were also reorganized during the interim with strengths of 13 officers and 267 airmen, and seven officers and 209 airmen, respectively. In anticipation of these reorganization procedures, this headquarters had requested, in April, that all aerial port operations squadrons be redesignated aerial transport squadrons. It was opined that the new designation would be more indicative of air force responsibilities, as aerial ports, which are established by theater commanders, may be operated by any service the latter designates.⁵⁶

Although Part II A of the aerial port operations squadron's T/0 accommodates the requirements for combat control teams (thereby eliminating separate squadron overhead), the road of air force acceptance for pathfinder responsibilities remains "bumpy." Material-wise, the teams have never received any T-7 or T-10 parachutes. (These are presently being procured from army units on a loan basis.)

The personnel problems of AFSC are not indicative of duty performed, nor do they identify personnel with this particular field of endeavor. Contrary to their army predecessors, air force combat control personnel are not authorized an identifying badge. There should be, it appears, a provision whereby these airmen can attain senior and master parachutist badges. This is an acute morale problem and, combined with the fact that there is no progression in grade possible, has considerably hindered the APOS (Ed: Aerial Port Operations Squadron) in enticing personnel into these teams. Of considerable consequence is the fact that there is no source of trained personnel; all are trained by the aerial port operations squadron. Since the latter also had no trained personnel fount on which to draw, the problem has been considerably magnified. The problems of the CCT’s and the APO’s have not been sufficiently resolved. AFL 55-6 still leaves some areas questionable as no firm policies of operations have been devised. Until these elements are removed from their “step-child” status, they will continue to be harassed by units of the army.

Relationship with Army Field Force Units
As denoted in the foregoing discussions on the Aeromedical Group and the Aerial Port Operations Squadrons (APOs), there remain many areas of disagreement between the two services. It is self-evident that troop carrier – airborne operations are, and will continue to be, of major import in the operational scheme. A workable solution to these problems is a must, but the end must not be attained at the expense of prostituting the air force position. The aircraft commander must be familiar with troop carrier’s position in joint operations, and must assert himself when his army counterpart questions these precepts. Experience has shown that the air force has been placed in a compromising position by a “weak-spined officer who has concurred with army opinion on a point in question. This deterrent, as noted in a previous history of this command, has been alleviated by indoctrination of crews. *

That this practice has proven timely is supported by evidence. Early in the period, a question of whether to violate higher headquarters directives was confronted by the 464th Troop Carrier Wing at Lawson AFB (GA). This problem stemmed from an aversion on the part of the 10th Special Forces Group, Airborne, at Dobbins AFB, Georgia, to conform to directives which stipulated that combat control teams would be utilized on joint tactical missions. The group had no objection to the employment of air force combat controllers in setting up the drop zones for routine training jumps, but did not concur that they should be employed for tactical jumps. ⁵⁷

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

54. Condensed from talk given by Col. Cecil Childre, DCS/Operations, Hq 18th AF at June 1953 Commanders' Conference.

55. 00 40, Hq 18AF, II4 May 1953.

56. Ltr., Hq 18th AF to Comdr TAC, 322, sub: Redesignation of Aerial Port Operations Squadron, 20 Apr. 1953.

* SECRET- History 18th AF – 1 Jan –30 Jun 1953

57. CONFIDENTIAL Ltr. Hq 19th SF Group, sub: Aircraft Support Data, 23 July 1953.

SECRET

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

SECRET

In view of the fact that the problem was definitely a question of policy, the 464th, rather than acquiesce to army demands, queried ^;this headquarters on the avenue of approach to take. Neither TAC nor this headquarters would permit deviation from established procedure and, on 11 August, the 464th was advised that the command supported its contention that no airlift of troops would be approved until the Service Forces withdrew their objection.

July witnessed several unusual requests from army units supported by the Eighteenth Air Force, requests which, if approved, would have given the stamp of approval to questioning air force capabilities. During the early summer months, the 82d Airborne Division had experienced a superfluity of casualties during training jumps. This was, of course, a morale factor, of importance and the army, in its desire to alleviate the situation, urged that a wind dummy be dropped from the aircraft (on morning missions) as a means of instilling confidence in the airborne troopers. This proposal met with mixed reactions, but a probation was given for approximately 60 days. The command remained adamant to additional overtures that this practice became a part of the SOP.

Of even greater import was XVIII Airborne Corps desire to place an airborne man in the cockpit of each aircraft to record airspeeds over the drop zone and while dropping troops.⁵⁹ This action was identical to questioning the integrity of the pilot and could not be subscribed to by this headquarters. It appears that the army is bent on injecting its character into areas that are specifically air force. In still another instance, the 82d Airborne division directed that a company grade air force officer give the demonstration commentary, when Tactical Air Command had proscribed that the discourse would be given by s field grade officer. ⁶⁰ Singly, these incidents are of little consequence, but when studied as a whole they spell out a concerted attempt by the army to usurp certain air force responsibilities.

Although the eighteenth is interested in preserving air force integrity, it recognizes the concern expressed by the array for the safety of its personnel and, through mutual understanding and agreement, is interested in lowering accidents and/or fatalities to paratroopers. Consequently, this headquarters was amenable to a July proposal of the 82d Airborne Division to jump in ten-man sticks with a jumpmaster tapping each man. This action necessitated each troop carrier aircraft making two passes but the expenditure of aircraft time was of little consequence if troop casualties could be lowered. As stated above, troop carrier was not amenable to the proposal that an airborne man ride in each aircraft to note airspeed over the drop zone. However, this information, in addition to altitude, free air temperature statistics was made available to the army and allowed the airborne corps safety board to study jump activities. ⁶¹It is emphasized that this was an interim measure for the August jump period and was not practiced throughout the six-month interval.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________

58. Recorded TP call, Col Johnson, Dir C&T, 18AF to Lt Col Roby, Ops Officer, 464th Trp Carrier Wg, subj: Adherence to TAC-OCAFF SOP for Troop Carrier-Airborne Operations, 11 Aug. 1953.

59. Recorded TP call, Maj. Stroup, ALO to XVIII Airborne Corps to Col Evans, Dir 0&T, Hq 18th AF, subj. Request for change in Procedure on Airborne Missions, 9 July 1953

60. Recorded TP call, Maj Stroup, ALO to XVIII Airborne Corps to Capt. Shaver, OOT, 18th AF, sub: Letter of Instructions No. 41, 8 July 1953.

61. Recorded TP call, Maj Stroup, ALO to XVIII Airborne Corps to Col Johnson, O&T, 18th AF, sub: Change in Jump Procedure for Airborne Troops, 27 July 1953.

SECRET

__________________________________________________________________________

SECRET

Paradrop inaccuracies continued rife throughout the period of this history. Especially was this true during August and September when several incidents occurred which focused attention on the trend of undue mishaps. The August incident, involving troop carrier aircraft of the 64th Troop Carrier Wing, has allegedly resulted in the dropping of 120 paratroopers in the trees outside of the drop zone. The first report proved erroneous as a check with the air liaison officer disclosed that a total of 14 had landed in the trees with no personnel injuries. Airforce interest was couched in hearsay that the army was taking pictures of the parachutes in the trees to point up the episode.⁶² Headquarters concern proved groundless, however, as ground force reaction was not as unfavorable as had been asserted.

The September blunder was of considerable significance as a. complete complement of airborne personnel (118 paratroopers) landed in the trees during a night drop. On the wind dummy pass, one dummy had landed 50 yards from the trees, the other in the trees. The combat controllers notified the aircraft commander that the drift was 500 yards at 3 o’clock, but the lead commander misinterpreted this to read 500 yards at 10 o’clock. ⁶³ Thus, the three aircraft, correcting further right on second pass, dropped all troops in the trees.

As one can readily deduce, such miscalculations place the air force in an unfavorable light. Therefore, it was timely that the Eighteenth should initiate a series of actions designed to prevent further occurrences of inattention to detail. Two avenues of action were taken. The first was to direct that the air liaison officer at XVIII Airborne Corps set up a system of pilot-jumpmaster briefings for all incoming crews. ⁶⁴ Secondly, a conference was held at this headquarters on 12-13 October 1953 to discuss problems relating to troop carrier – airborne operations. Attended by representatives of all wings and combat control teams, the agenda included drop zone safety control and the CARP system. The latter was given additional cognizance at a conference on 3 November, when Headquarters Eighteenth Air Force afforded additional indoctrination on the air dropping of troops by means of this system. *

Troop Carrier-Airborne SOP
The difficulties outlined above emphasized that troop carrier units were proficient in varying degrees, and that a need existed for changes in troop carrier-airborne operational procedures if these mission inadequacies were to be eliminated. As early in the period as July, Colonel Edson, G-3 XVIII Airborne Corps had expressed concern that troop carrier units were at variance not only in their in-flight procedures but their ground briefing as well. The Colonel exemplified this by stating that “one unit will brief that in the event of an emergency, the aircraft commander will ring the emergency bell three short rings, at which time the jumpmaster will order the troops to stand up, hook up, and then sit down.” ⁶⁵ Some units had issued instructions that intermittent ringing of the emergency bell did not necessitate standing up, hooking up and then sitting down; merely that troopers that should remain seated with fastened safety belts until the emergency bell was turned on continuously to indicate abandoning of the aircraft. The TAC-OCAFF SOC of 1951 outlined the first of the two procedures mentioned, but it was felt by the Eighteenth Air Force that this could be changed if the airborne desired.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________

62.    Recorded TP call, Col Johnson, 18th AF, to Maj Stroup XVIII Airborne Corps, sub. Unsuccessful Paradrop Mission at Fort Bragg, 14 Aug. 1953.

63.    Ltr., Hq 456^th Trp Carr Wg to Comdr 18^th AF, WOT 373.2, sub: Report of Incident at Fort Bragg, 23 Sep. 1953.

64.    Ltr., Hq 18^th AF to Maj Stroup, ALO, OOT-F 354.2, sub: Letter of instructions, 5 Oct. 1953.

* A discussion of the CARP system appears in this history. (Ed Note: This is a part of the history document not received by this Editor.)

SECRET

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

SECRET

A second divergence involved the opening of aircraft doors. Several units flew with the doors open in flight, while others opened them four minutes prior to aircraft arrival over the air release point. The airborne asserted that this was an insufficient interval to position and push their bundles out at the terminus – air release point.

Colonel Edson’s concern regarding these inconsistencies was appreciated by this command, and appropriate action was taken to allay airborne apprehensiveness when, on 15 September, a directive was issued to all wings which outlined changes in the TAC-CCAFF SOP for Troop Carrier Airborne Operations. "Of particular Import was command approbation that (for airdrop operations) aircraft doors will be opened a minimum of 20 minutes prior to drop time in all instances where flight time permits."

Experience has dictated continuing needs for changes in the TAC-OCAFF SOP for Troop Carrier Airborne Operations. This has been due, in particular, to the advent of the C-124 with its tremendous capabilities. It had been proven conclusively during Exercise TEST DROP that this aircraft was adaptable to personnel as well as equipment drops. However, the 62d Troop Carrier Wing believed the employment of this aircraft, because of its marked payload of humanity, was somewhat at variance with that of other troop carrier aircraft, particularly in the area of formation flying. As a consequence, this troop carrier wing, on 6 October 1953 forwarded its recommends for changes to the existing SOP. ⁶⁷ This headquarters realized that an element of disparity existed between utilization of heavy and medium aircraft but did not believe it of sufficient import to amend an SOP to pinpoint those differences. Rather, it was felt that any manual could reflect these changes by means of notations in lieu of a separate annex.

______________________________________________________________________________________________________

65. Recorded TP call, Maj. Stroup XVIII Airborne Corps, ALO to Maj. Hanton, 18th aF 00T, sub: SOP for Troop Carrier-Airborne Operations, 21 July 1953.

66. Ltr., Hq 18th AF to all wings, OOT-B 373 sub TAC-OCAFF SOP for Troop Carrier Airborne Operations, 16 Feb. 1951, 15 Sep 1953

67. Ltr., Hq 62d Trp Carr Wg to Comdr 18th AF, sub: Prepared Changes to TAC OCAFF Manual, 6 Oct 1953.

SECRET

__________________________________________________________________________

Acting on this premise, the 62d proposals, and those of the other wings were retained at Eighteenth Air Force Headquarters and studied within the Directorate of Operations and Training. The results of these studies, discussed with wing representatives at several conferences late in the period, were to the effect that this headquarters would prepare an unilateral troop carrier SOP (in the form of a manual) for distribution prior to the spring maneuvers of 1954. ⁶⁸ Through this medium, the lack of uniformity and obsolescence in operational procedures, so prevalent within the existing TAC OCAFF SOP would be replaced by standardization.*

Factors Behind the Proposed Manual
As has been mentioned previously, inconsistencies on the part of troop carrier units personnel had occasionally placed this headquarters in a compromising position. Wing commanders were notified of these indiscretions and action leading up to the proposed manual were implemented by divers means.

A message to all commanders on 24 July directed their attention to air force doctrines policies, and their responsibilities in joint airborne operations. ⁶⁹ On several missions, commanders had not utilized the CARP and had allowed the army to assume responsibilities assigned the air force by joint agreement. As a consequence, the wings were directed to screen, select, and indoctrinate those officers well qualified in all phases of airborne operations for potential mission commanders. From this pool of personnel, one pilot served as OIC of wing elements on all joint airborne training and/or operations missions to which his unit was committed

Additionally, each wing was required to establish lead crews - three per squadron for heavy tactical groups, and four per squadron for medium tactical groups. This procedure combined with the establishment of a briefing team (as directed by this headquarters) was another step toward 'adequate indoctrination of troop carrier echelons. ⁷⁰ Concurrently with this action, wings were directed to place a field grade officer on the drop zone during personnel drops. ⁷¹ This, however, did not prove feasible as it extended wing capabilities when several DZ's were required for a mission. As an alleviatory measure, units were instructed that a fully qualified troop carrier pilot would suffice.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

68. MSG 18AF00T-W 121398, Comdr 18th AF to Comdr TAC, subs Unilateral SOP.

* In essence, the objective of an unilateral 18AF procedural manual permits the commander to alter his own tactics and techniques (which are within his prerogative) when and how he sees fit without having to resort to negotiations with another service, which, obviously, becomes necessary when such procedures are published under cover of a joint document.

SECRET

These were but several of the measures taken to combat the situation, wing commanders were also directed to publish SOP's for slow down of aircraft into the drop zone. ⁷² Although this assured a semblance of standardization in individual wing formations it was discernible that there would be as many different SOP's as there were wings. This fact further emphasized the need for a manual which would set forth uniform procedures for all tactical groups. The combat controller came in for further consideration during this study of conflicting directives. To protect the combat control teams, this headquarters prohibited their employment in other than prepared drop zones, unless concurrence was given by Eighteenth Air Force. Furthermore, wing commanders having operational control for a specific mission were directed to assure that medical and voice communication facilities were present in the drop zone prior to dropping of personnel. ⁷³

This question of dropping personnel has been a continuing one. Injuries to paratrooper personnel had been instrumental in the army's opining that drop speeds were too high. Air force countered with the allegation that lowering of the drop speed would create a stability hazard, a situation more dangerous to personnel safety than a high Indicated Air Speed (IAS) at the moment of drop. Therefore, the Eighteenth, on 16 December, directed that the IAS for drops of personnel and equipment from C-119 and C-124 aircraft would be 130.knots. A single exception permitted the commander of the 464th Troop Carrier Wing to lower the speed to 115 knots for novice drops at Fort Benning. This policy was short lived as Tactical Air Command, two days later, outlined that the IAS for both aircraft would be 130 knots when troops were using the T-10 parachute, but would be reduced to 115 knots when T-7 parachutes were employed. ⁷⁴

The critical aspect of drop speed in the operation of heavy troop carrier aircraft had been noted by the 62d Troop Carrier Wing in a July mission. As a result of this experience, the wing requested that AFM 60-1 be amended to add: "Characteristic of C-124 is that once airspeed is reduced, an abnormal power setting is required to gain the airspeed lost." This was critical on final approach and the 62d desired to maintain speed on the final leg approach between 130 knots and 120 per cent of stalling speed. ⁷⁵ Approbation was given this proposal pending revision of the air force manual.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________

69. MSG 18AF00T-W 7-1416, Comdr 18th AF to wing comdrs, 24 July 1953.

70.           CONFIDENTIAL Personal ltr., Maj Gen Douglass to Gen Cannon, 5 Dec. 1953 in AAG 360.33.

71.           MSG 18AFOOT-120445 and 18AF to all wings, 8 Dec, 1953.

72.           MSG 18AFOOT-2 111381 and 18AF to all wings circa 15 Dec. 1953.

73.    MSG 18AFOOT-G11-0205 and 18th AF to all wings.

74.    MSG 18AFOOT-W 120972 and 18th AF to Comdrs all wings, 18 Dec. 1953.

SECRET

Procurement of T-10 parachutes for Combat Control Team personnel was a problem throughout this period of history. Late in July, this headquarters had set forth its requirements for T-10's but had met with opposition at Headquarters Air Material Command. Again in September the necessity for these chutes was re-emphasized, as their inherent advantages would permit a 130 IAS drop speed. These advantages included: (1) improved formation flying during parachute drops; (2) improved pilot control of individual aircraft; (3) increased aircraft stability during drops; (4) decrease in hazards during engine failures at low airspeeds when dropping; and (5) exploitation of the potential employment of the C-124 aircraft for troop dropping operations.

This final advantage was of primary import as utilization of the C-124 for personnel drops remained in the embryo stage notwithstanding Exercise TEST DROP. Faced with this realization, the command reached a decision to utilize C-124s during December training missions at both Fort Bragg and Campbell Air Force Base, as a means to familiarize both pilots and personnel of the aerial port squadron in drop procedures.⁷⁶ Subsequent application of this policy proved the logic sound for, on 15 December, successful mass drops of 11th Airborne Division personnel were made at Fort Campbell. ⁷⁷ This mass exiting bore out conclusions reached by the 504th Airborne Infantry early in November. In its after action report, the 504th had concluded that (1) C-124's were excellent aircraft for exiting of large numbers of parachutists (2) C-124s plus T-10 parachutes helped maintain unit integrity and (3) V’s in trail were the best formation for these drops. ⁷⁸ It is believed that this success will contribute toward future employment of the C-124 in paratroop missions, and open the door for its utilization in TACAIR 54-7, the joint spring maneuver of 1954.

______________________________________________________________________________________________________

75. Ltr. Comdr 62d Trp Carr Wg and to Comdr 18th AF, DO 300.7, sub: Proposed Change to AFM 60-1, 23 July 1953.

76. Ltr., Hq 18th AF to Cmdr TAC, OOT-0 373.5, sub: Utilization of C-124 Aircraft on Training Missions.

77. Extracted from Daily Bulletin 246, Hq 18AF, 17 Dec. 1953.

78. Ltr., Hq 504^th Abrn Infantry, sub: After Action Report C-124 Personnel Drops, 23 Nov. 1953.

SECRET

The INCOMPLETE and UNCLASSIFIED
18th Air Force Historical Document ends here.

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

CCT CAREER FIELDS - Pre-1956
by
Gene Adcock, CMSgt, USAF (CCT) Retired
with input from
Vern Morgan, SMSgt, USAF (CCT) Retired

According to long-time Combat Controller Vernon Morgan - in April 1954 - he and two others were selected as radio operators and assigned to the 464th Troop Carrier Wing, 3rd Aerial Port Squadron, Lawson AFB - at Fort Benning, GA. At that time the Wing was flying the C-119 Flying Boxcar. Later that year, the Wing, Squadron and Team moved to Pope AFB, NC. In 1955, the first true assault-lander - the C-123 Provider - was introduced into the Air Force’s airlift fleet.

At the same time, the Air Staff decided that ATC-certification was required by those operators controlling traffic at assault landing zones. According to Morgan, it was around that time - in early-1956 - that the Civil Air Administration (CAA) sent a team of instructors to Pope to qualify the team’s Radio Operators to control air traffic. After a three-day course of instruction and qualification test, the CAA issued ATC certificates to the newly christened Combat Control (ATC) operators. Within months, Air Force trained Air Traffic Controllers were being assigned to the Combat Control Teams.

Morgan recalls, some of those early CCT Radio Operators that finished jump school together; they were: